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 This report summarizes the analysis of legal education market data, compiled by the 
American Bar Association and presented on the AccessLex website, by a research team from the 
University of Pennsylvania's Alliance for Higher Education and Democracy (AHEAD).  Robert 
Zemsky served as principal investigator and Richard Morgan as principal analyst.  The research 
was conducted over two years and yielded two PowerPoint presentations to AccessLex's annual 
research symposium.  
 As reported last year, the contraction in the market for full-time undergraduate legal 
education leading to a JD or equivalent degree was truly astonishing.  Between 2011 and 2015, 
total enrollments in the 200-plus United States law schools whose data are regularly tracked by 
the American Bar Association (ABA) decreased by more than 20 percent.  The total number of 
“missing students” was just shy of 30,000, an amount which translates into the total enrollments 
of 38 average-sized law schools—24 private not-for-profits and 14 publics. 
 Equally remarkable was the rigidly structured market the contraction revealed.  Just two 
variables—median LSAT score and first-year attrition—determined each school of law's place in 
the market and the net price which that school could charge.  It proved to be a market with two 
principal sectors—public and private—and within each sector a limited number of tiers or 
segments.  Schools at the top of the market had high Median LSAT scores and very little first-
year attrition; schools at the bottom of the market had low Median LSAT scores and high first-
year attrition (Figure 1). 
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                                   Figure 1:  Market Structure 
     
Public Law Schools  Private Law Schools 
     
Tier 1    Tier 1   
Median LSAT  159  Median LSAT  166 
First Year Attrition <5%  First Year Attrition <5% 
Average Net Price  $21,635  Average Net Price  $39,011 
N  25    N  26   
     
Tier 2    Tier 2   
Median LSAT  157  Median LSAT  156 
First Year Attrition 5-9.9%  First Year Attrition 5-9.9% 
Average Net Price  $20,020  Average Net Price  $29,939 
N  24    N  24   
     
Tier 3    Tier 3   
Median LSAT  153  Median LSAT  152 
First Year Attrition 10% +  First Year Attrition 10-20% 
Average Net Price  $16,988  Average Net Price  $30,686 
N  21    N  37   
     
   Tier 4   
   Median LSAT  147 
   First Year Attrition 20% + 
   Average Net Price  $35,671 
   N  14   
 
 
 We also developed a simple schematic for representing change over time for the key 
variables in our analysis.  Borrowing from the language of Weather predictions that differentiate 
between “Storm Warnings” and “Storm Watches” we plotted two sets of lines:  a “Watch Line” 
for when a law school's data indicated potential problems ahead; and a “Warning Line” when 
that data indicated substantial problems already at hand (Figure 2).  In each case, we used our 
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experience with the data to define the relevant “Watch” and “Warning” lines.  At the same time, 
we noted that the slope of the line plotting the data was equally revealing.  We also projected the 
likely continuation of the plot line as an indication of future developments. 
      Figure 2:  Schematic for Plotting Change Over Time 
 
 
In the sample schematic above a sample law school's applications from 2011-2016 are plotted 
(solid black line), along with an estimate of its likely applicants going forward beyond 2016 
(dotted back line).  By 2016, this institution's applications were already below the Watch line and 
heading for less than 500 applications or a full Warning indication in the not too distant future. 
 
Loss of Applications 
 As we observed in each of our presentations to an AccessLex Legal Education Research 
Symposium, the contraction in the market for legal education in the United States have been 
broad, impacting all sectors, all tiers, and nearly all institutions.  Figure 3 (below) presents the 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Sample  Institution: Applications
Warning Line
Watch Line
 4 
contractions across the three tiers within public sector institutions.  All tiers lost applications—
and the slopes of the lines are nearly parallel—but the loss was most severe among the Tier 3 
institutions.  The projection is for the institutions in this bottom tier to face increasing difficulties 
as the contraction in the market continues. 
Figure 3:  Average Applications to Public Sector Law Schools 
 
 
 
The stress among Private Sector Law Schools is even more pronounced, particularly among the 
bottom tier (Figure 4 below).  The top of the market, while also losing applications, remained 
mostly robust.  The bottom of the market, particularly Tier 4 was already experiencing losses 
that were at or near the Watch line. 
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Figure 4:  Average Applications to Private Sector Law Schools 
  
 Focusing on Median LSAT Scores tells a slightly different story.  While averages have 
dropped over the last half dozen years, the contraction is not as severe as the contraction in the 
number of applicants.  The implication is that potential applicants with lower LSAT scores are 
withdrawing from both the Public Sector and the Private Sector markets. 
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Figure 5:  Median LSAT Scores Public Sector Law Schools 
 
 
The same holds true for the top of the Private Sector law schools, though the deterioration 
at the bottom of the market is much more pronounced—signaling that schools in these bottom 
tiers will have increasing difficulty attracting applicants with acceptable LSAT scores.  
Figure 6:  Median LSAT Scores Private Sector Law Schools 
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The sharpest predictor of competitive position and future problems remains first-year 
attrition—a figure that includes students who drop out of law school, as well as those who leave 
one school and then transfer to another, more competitive law school.  Figure 7 presents first 
year attrition for the three tiers of the Public Law School Sector.  Here the schools in trouble are 
almost exclusively in the bottom tier.  The implication is that schools in the top tiers are able to 
maintain their student bodies by admitting students transferring from a bottom tier institution. 
Figure 7:  Median First-Year Attrition Public Sector Law Schools 
 
 
The big losers are the Private Sector Law Schools in Tier 4.  For the true bottom of the 
market, Tier 4, average first-year attrition by 2016 was nearly 30 percent and heading further 
south. 
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Figure 8:  Median First-Year Attrition Private Sector Law Schools 
 
 
 
Focusing on admit rates completes our analysis of the current competitive shape of the 
market for legal education in the United States.  The market actually stabilized across the top two 
Public Sector law school tiers with most institutions accepting no more than half of their 
applicants.  The exceptions among Public Sector law schools were those in Tier 3, where the 
average acceptance rate was 55 percent of applicants and trending downward. 
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Figure 9:  Average Admit Rates Public Sector Law Schools 
 
Again, it is in the bottom of the Private Sector law school market that the greatest fraying 
takes place.  After five years of sustained market contraction, Tier 4 institutions, on average, 
found themselves admitting 60 to 70 percent of their applicants while at the same time losing a 
quarter or more of the students they did manage to enroll in the students’ first year. 
Figure 10:  Average Admit Rates Private Sector Law Schools 
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Building a Law School Stress Test 
We developed the four key measures described above—Applications, LSAT, Attrition 
and Admit Rate—as a means of describing the market for a legal education in the United States.  
Collectively, the four measures reflect the highly structured nature of that market in which there 
is an ordering of tiers and segments.  The top tiers in each of the market segments—Public and 
Private—enjoy all of the advantages:  more applicants, higher Median LSAT scores, lower 
attrition, and lower admit rates.  Conversely, schools in the bottom tiers face substantial 
challenges that will likely linger absent a dramatic increase in the number of students seeking a 
JD degree.  Just knowing that one's institution belongs in Tier 4 (first-year attrition greater than 
20 percent) is probably sufficient warning that the school's sustainability is at risk. 
To provide further and more detailed information to individual law schools we developed 
what we came to call a Law School Stress Test.  We started with three of the key market 
variables described above:  Median LSAT Score, First-Year Attrition, and Admit Rate.  In 
addition to these market indicators we calculated two outcome measures again drawing on data 
available on the AccessLex website: Bar Passage Rate and Long Term Employment (percent 
employed full-time long term).  As with the market indicators, we developed a schematic that 
identified whether or not a specific institution's outcome measures were below either a Watch or 
Warning line. 
Let's start with a good-news, name brand Private a Tier 1 institution, whose market and 
outcomes scores suggest relatively smooth sailing ahead. 
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Figure 11:  Private Tier 1 Law School Stress Test—Market Variables 
 
 
 
The resulting profile is an envious one—a consistently high Median LSAT Score of 165, 
little or no first-year attrition, and a less than 30 percent admit rate to fill its first-year class. 
Not quite as secure, but none-the-less safe were this institution's outcome measures. 
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Figure 12:  Private Tier 1 Stress Test—Outcome Variables 
 
 
 
Although the outcome measures are not quite as impressive—a declining Bar Passage Rate1 that 
is still above the Watch line and Long Term Employment2 numbers that are improving despite a 
decrease in long-term job prospects—the institution can look forward a secure future. Put 
simply—this Private Tier 1 name-brand law school passed our stress test with flying colors. At 
the other end of the spectrum is a Tier 4 Private law school with decidedly declining prospects.  
                                                 
1 Bar Passage Rate = total number of bar exam passers (reporting jurisdictions)/ total number of bar exam takers 
(reporting jurisdictions).  
 
2 Long Term Employment (% Employed Full-Time Long Term) = (Number Employed Bar Passage Required-Full-Time 
Long-Term + Number Employed JD Advantage -Full-Time Long-Term)/Total Number of Graduates 
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Its Median LSAT score has dipped below 150 with the prospect of likely further declines.  First 
Year Attrition now exceeds 40 %.  To enroll it most recent class this Law School admitted 70% 
of its applicants. 
Figure 13:  Private Tier 4 Law School Stress Test—Market Variables 
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This school's outcome measures—Bar Passage Rate and Long-Term Employment—were, 
if anything, even more alarming.  Despite a recent improvement, the Bar Passage Rate had 
declined to just 38 percent and the Long Term Employment to 39 percent.  This school is no 
longer admitting new students and will shortly conclude its teach-out of previously enrolled 
students. 
Figure 14:  Private Tier 4 Stress Test—Outcome Variables 
 
 
 
The purpose of the Stress Test is to alert individual institutions to potential trouble and, in 
particular, a continued loss in applications.  We concluded our analysis by looking at three 
institutions with different Stress Test results: stability, threatened, and closing.  Below we 
summarize our results. 
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Figure 15:  Projecting Applications 
 
 
Next Task 
 Our analytic work for this project is now complete.  We have developed the architecture for a 
structured market model, processed the data from the AccessLex website in accordance with the 
model's dimensions, a calculated Stress Test for the 171 institutions for which we have complete data. 
The largest remaining task is to develop a publication making our model and results generally 
available to the legal education community.  This past year the Johns Hopkins University Press 
published our The Market Imperative, which reported on our parallel analysis of the market for 
undergraduate education in the United States.  We will now approach the JHU press to see if it would 
be interested in publishing our study of the market for legal education in the United States. 
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